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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to provide a binary comparison of two distance−based
preference aggregation rules, Slater’s rule and Kemeny’s rule. It will be shown that for
certain lists of individual preferences the outcomes will be antagonistic in the sense that what
is considered best according to one rule is considered worst according to the other rule.
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1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a binary comparison of two distance-based preference 
aggregation rules, Slater’s rule and Kemeny’s rule. Both rules avoid the problem of voting 
cycles, and therefore, they are used in the literature to extend the simple majority rule as it is 
pointed out by Fishburn (1977). Moreover, not only do those voting rules guarantee a choice 
but even a transitive social preference.  
Inherent in both voting rules is the idea of being “close” to simple majority rule. Intuitively, 
ranking the alternatives according to Kemeny’s rule can be seen as the best compromise in the 
sense that on average it gives the “closest” social preference to the individual preferences. The 
social preference derived from Slater’s rule is intuitively close to simple majority rule as it 
minimizes the distance to the simple majority relation. To be more precise, Kemeny’s rule is 
the composition of simple majority rule with the function that assigns the “closest” 
unanimous preference profile to any preference profile. Slater’s rule is the composition of the 
function that assigns the “closest” weak order to any complete binary relation with the simple 
majority rule. Such “closest” social preferences need not necessarily be unique. This paper 
shows that there exist preference profiles such that the Slater winner, i.e. the top alternative in 
the social preference derived from the Slater rule, is the Kemeny loser, i.e. the bottom 
alternative in the social preference derived from the Kemeny rule, and vice versa. Hence, 
despite this common underlying idea of “closeness” to simple majority rule, for certain 
preference profiles the outcomes of the two rules will be antagonistic in the sense that what is 
considered best according to one rule is considered worst according to the other rule. 
The significance of those voting rules lies, on the one hand, in the fact that both rules are used 
to overcome the problems of voting cycles and intransitivities associated with simple majority 
rule (Fishburn, 1977). On the other hand, the richer information provided by voting rules, 
which instead of selecting just one alternative, rank all alternatives, has obvious advantages.
1 
For example, recruitment committees rank candidates to avoid having to call for a new 
meeting in case higher ranked candidates drop out later. Therefore, further insight into the 
binary relationship between the Slater rule and the Kemeny rule will be useful in evaluating 
the differences in the social preferences that might occur. 
Comparisons of preference aggregation rules in general take place in various different 
frameworks. Fishburn (1977) analyses different social choice functions using an axiomatic 
framework. His analysis and comparison is based on whether or not they satisfy certain 
reasonable conditions for social choice functions. Laffond et al. (1995) use a set-theoretical 
framework. They compare tournament choice correspondences
2 providing results on the 
inclusion/disjunction relations between different correspondences. For pairs of choice 
correspondences they determine whether the selected alternatives of one are also always 
selected by the other, whether there is always a non-empty intersection, or whether for some 
tournaments there is an empty intersection. In contrast, Ratliff (2001, 2002) compares 
Dodgson’s rule to Kemeny’s rule and the Borda rule in a framework which is binary and 
distance-based, i.e. considers binary relations obtained from voting rules with respect to the 
distance between them. He shows that there is no consistency between the Dodgson rule and 
the other two rules in the sense that the Dodgson winner can be found in any position of the 
                                                 
1 Such rules which assign an alternative from the entire set of alternatives to any preference profile, are called 
voting schemes in Gibbard (1973). This should not be confused with social choice functions which assign to any 
pair consisting of a preference profile and a subset of the set of alternatives a non-empty subset of that set. Hence 
social choice functions have more structure than the voting rules used in this paper. 
2 A tournament social choice correspondence assigns a subset of the set of alternatives to any binary relation 
over the set of alternatives.   2
social preferences derived from Kemeny’s rule and Borda’s rule. It is the latter approach 
which will be followed in this paper. 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section states the formal framework. Sections 3 
and 4 introduce the Slater rule and the Kemeny rule. Finally, the main theorems are presented 
and proved in section 5.  
 
 
2 Formal Framework 
 
Let X denote a finite set of  4 m ≥  alternatives and I denote a finite set of  2 n ≥  individuals. A 
preference relation 
2 R X ⊆  is a binary relation on X. For all  , x yX ∈ , the weak preference of 
x over y will be denoted by  R x y \ , the symmetric and asymmetric parts of R will be written 
as  R ∼  and  R    respectively.
3 For any set TX ⊆ ,  ( ) { } |, : , R Tx y R x y T =∈∈  is the 
restriction of R to T. Let B  be the set of all complete binary relations on  X ,  ⊂ WB  the set 
of all weak orders (complete and transitive binary relations) on  X  and  ⊂ LW  the set of all 
linear orders (complete, transitive and asymmetric binary relations) on  X . A preference 
profile will be denoted by  () 12 , ,...,
uu u n
n uR R R =∈ W  where 
u
i R ∈W  is individual i’s 
preference on X in preference profile u. For all  , jk x xX ∈ , the majority margin of  j x  over  k x  
in profile 
n u∈W  is denoted by  { } { } , :: uu
ii
u
jk j k k j RR ai I xxi I xx =∈ −∈ ;; .
4 We define 
simple majority rule as a function  :
n v → B W  such that for all 
n u∈W  and all  , jk x xX ∈ , 
() jv uk x x \  if and only if  , 0
u
jk a ≥ . That is, an alternative  j x  is at least as good as alternative 
k x  if and only if there are at least as many individuals preferring  j x  over  k x  than there are 
individuals preferring  k x  over  j x .  
Finally, use will be made of concepts which measure the distance between binary relations 
and preference profiles, respectively. Let   be the set of all real numbers. The Kemeny 
distance between two binary relations  , RR ′∈B  is given by half the cardinality of their 
symmetric difference
5, i.e  ()
() ()
2 ,
RR R R RR δ
′′ −∪− ′ = . Distance on the set of preference profiles 
will be measured by the distance function  :
nn d + ×→ WW \  which is such that for all 
,








du u R R δ
=
′ =∑ . 
 
 
3 Slater’s Rule 
 
To preserve the attractiveness of the simple majority rule even in cases of intransitive simple 
majority relations, Slater (1961) suggested assigning the weak order which is of minimal 
distance to the simple majority relation. I.e., Slater’s rule is the composition of the function 
that assigns the closest weak order to the simple majority relation relative to the Kemeny 
                                                 
3 Subscripts will be dropped whenever there is no danger of confusion. 
4 Whenever there is no danger of confusion the superscript will be dropped. 
5 The division by 2 is for the convenience of being able to talk about distance values and numbers of pairwise 
switches interchangeably.   3
distance function with simple majority rule.
6 The Slater ranking will thus be defined as 
follows: 
 
Definition 1: For all profiles 
n u∈W ,  S ∈W  is the Slater ranking if and only if for all 
R∈W ,  () () () , () , vu S vu R δδ ≤ . 
 
 
The intuition behind Slater’s rule can also be seen in Figure 1, where in addition to the 
notation defined above, 
n ⊂ U W  is the set of all unanimous preference profiles, i.e. u∈U  if 
and only if for some R∈W , 
u
i R R =  for all iI ∈ . Figure 1 provides an example of simple 
majority rule leading to a non-transitive outcome. Given the preference profile 
n u∈W , the 
simple majority rule provides a non-transitive social preference  ( ) vu, i.e.  () vu∉W . Hence, 
Slater’s way to overcome such problems is by assigning the closest preference relation in W  
to any  () vu. 
 
 
4 Kemeny Ranking 
 
Kemeny’s (1959) approach is focusing on the domain of v. In particular, if  () vu∉W , then the 
Kemeny rule selects the social preference  ( ) vu ′ , where u′∈U  minimizes the Kemeny 
distance between the preference profile 
n u∈W  and all preference profiles u′′∈U .
7 This can 
also be seen in Figure 1. The Kemeny ranking is now defined as follows: 
 
Definition 2: Let  ( , ,..., ) uK KK =∈ U . For all 
n u∈W ,  K ∈W  is the Kemeny ranking if 
and only if for all u′∈U ,  ()( ) ,, du u du u ′ ≤ . 
 
Saari and Merlin (2000) suggested a more convenient way to derive the Kemeny ranking 
based only on information about the pairwise margins. To be more precise, let, for all 
                                                 
6 That distance minimization relative to different distance functions can characterize different aggregation rules 
can be seen in Baigent and Klamler (2004) who provide a distance characterisation of the transitive closure rule. 
7 Young and Levenglick (1978) provide a detailed discussion of the Kemeny rule and prove that the Kemeny 
rule is the unique rule that is neutral, consistent, and Condorcet.  
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n u∈W , and all R∈W ,  { } { } { } { } , : ( ) |, |,
u
R x yX v u x yR x y =⊂ ≠ C  be the set of all pairs 
such that the preference over these pairs is different in v(u) and R. Then for all 
n u∈W , the 
function :













. This means 
that the function g
u counts the margins over pairs of alternatives whose preference is different 
in v(u) and R. 
 
Lemma 1: (Saari and Merlin, 2000): For all 
n u∈W ,  K ∈W  is the Kemeny ranking if and 
only if for all R∈W ,  () ()





In this section we will show that for some preference profiles Slater’s rule and Kemeny’s rule 
will result in antagonistic outcomes in the sense that what is considered best according to one 
rule is considered worst according to the other rule.  
 
The following example will provide some intuition for the results that will be proved below. 
 
Example 1: Consider  { } 1234 ,,, X xxxx = ,  9 I = , and the following preference profile 
9 u∈W  given in Table 1, where alternatives in higher rows are preferred to alternatives in 
lower rows and the numbers in the first row determine how many voters have each ranking. 
 
3 1 2 2 1 
x1  x2  x3  x4  x4 
x2  x3  x2  x1  x3 
x3  x4  x4  x2  x2 
x4  x1  x1  x3  x1 
Table 1: Preference Profile 
 
This preference profile is such that the pairwise tallies and margins are as stated in Table 2. 
Obviously, there is a cycle including all alternatives in X. Since the preference relation S 
which is such that for all pairs of alternatives ( ) ( ) 14 ,, ij x xx x ≠ ,  iS j x x \  if and only if 
() iv uj x x \  and  14 S x x ;  has a Kemeny distance of 1 and any other transitive preference 
relation has a strictly higher Kemeny distance, we can conclude that  1 x  is the Slater winner 
and  4 x  is the Slater loser. From Table 2 we can also determine the Kemeny ranking using 
Saari and Merlin’s method. For the preference relation S we get a value of  () 3
u gS = , as only 
one switch in the pair  14 , x x  has to be made, giving a margin of 3. Consider the preference 
relation K,  2341 KKK x xxx    . This leads to a value  ()2
u gK = . As any other weak order will 
definitely have a value larger than 3, K is the Kemeny ranking and  1 x  the Kemeny loser. 
   5
 Tallies  Margins   Tallies  Margins 
12 x x     5,4 1  23 x x     6,3 3 
13 x x     5,4 1  24 x x     6,3 3 
14 x x     3,6 -3  34 x x     6,3 3 
Table 2: Pairwise margins 
 
Hence, this example shows the existence of antagonistic outcomes of Slater’s rule and 
Kemeny’s rule. We generalize this observation in the following two theorems.  
 
Theorem 1: If there are at least four alternatives, then there exist preference profiles such that 
the unique Slater winner is the unique Kemeny loser.  
 
Theorem 2: If there are at least four alternatives, then there exist preference profiles such that 
the unique Kemeny winner is the unique Slater loser. 
 
As the following results will depend on creating particular preference profiles, we will make 
use of a theorem in Saari (1995).
8 Let   be the set of all integers. Given a preference profile 
n u∈W , the vector of pairwise majority margins will be denoted by 
()
() 2
1,2 , 1, ,..., ,...,
m
uu u u
jk m m wa a a − =∈    where  { } , 1,2,..., , jk m j k ∈ < .  
 
Lemma 2:
 For any  ( ) 2
m
z∈   with all entries having the same parity, there exists a preference 
profile 
n u∈L  such that 
u wz = .
9 
 
Proof of Theorem 1: Let 
n u∈W  be such that  1,
u
j al =  for all  { } 2,3,..., 1 jm ∈ − ,  ,
u
jk aq =  for 
all  { } , 2,3,..., jk m ∈ ,  jk < , and  1,
u
m ah = − . Obviously, given a preference profile 
n u∈W  
which satisfies the stated conditions, applying the majority rule leads to a non-transitive social 
preference relation of the form  12 1 1 ... mm x xx x x −         . 
Slater part: The unique Slater ranking S ∈W  is  12 1 ... S S Sm Sm x xx x −        and 
() () , 1 vu S δ = . Any preference relation with  1 x  above  m x  but with 1 x  not on top will 
obviously be of larger Kemeny distance from the simple majority relation. In any preference 
relation with  m x  above  1 x ,  m x  has to be moved above at least  2 ms − −  alternatives and  1 x  
has to be moved below at least s alternatives (22 sm ≤ ≤− ). It is obvious that there have to 
be at least  2 m−  switches, which guarantees that, for  4 m ≥ ,  1 x  will be the Slater winner for 
any , lh + ∈  . 
Kemeny part: Consider the three preference relations  ,, RR R ′ ′′∈W  such that 
12 1 ... R R Rm Rm x xx x −       ,  23 1 1 ... R R Rm RmR x xx x x ′′ ′ ′ ′ −         and 
12 1 ... mR R R R m x xx x ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′ −      . It follows that  ()
u g Rh = ,  () ( 2 )
u gR l m ′ =−  and 
() ( 2 )
u gR q m ′′ =− . It is obvious that any other preference relation R∈W  has 
                                                 
8 A similar version of that theorem can be found in the literature on tournaments by Debord (1987). Extensions 
of that lemma can be found in Ratliff (2001) and Klamler (2002). 
9 For a proof of lemma 2 refer to Saari (1995) or Ratliff (2001),   6
{ } ( ) m i n , (2 ) , (2 )
u gR h l m q m >− − . Therefore only  , R R′ and/or R′′ could be closest to u in the 
Kemeny sense. Now it is clear that  1 x , the Slater winner, is the Kemeny loser in R′. But R′ is 
the unique Kemeny ranking whenever  (2 ) lm h − <  and lq < . By Lemma 2 such a preference 
profile exists and this proves the theorem.   
 
Proof of Theorem 2: Let the preference profile be such as in the proof of Theorem 1.  
Slater part: As before the unique Slater ranking S ∈W  is  12 1 ... S S Sm Sm x xx x −        and  m x  
is the Slater loser. 
Kemeny part: Consider, as before, the three preference relations  ,, R RR ′ ′′ which could be the 
only possible Kemeny rankings. Now it is clear that  m x , the Slater loser, is the Kemeny 
winner in ranking R′′. But R′′ is the unique Kemeny ranking whenever  (2 ) qm h −<  and 
ql < . By Lemma 2 such a preference profile exists and this proves the theorem.   
   7
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